SunTrip

Things have been looking a bit brighter in Iraq this summer. Commanders and some independent observers report that the "surge" of 30,000 more U.S. troops has tamped down the violence, particularly in Baghdad. Some tribal Sunni sheiks have turned against al-Qaeda, particularly in volatile Anbar province. Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has said that his Mahdi Army militia is suspending fighting for six months. No wonder U.S. opinion polls show greater optimism, or at least less pessimism, about the Iraq war.

President Bush has been out making speeches capitalizing on the sunnier mood and playing down the Iraqi failure to meet most political benchmarks (even though he earlier vowed to hold Iraqi leaders to them). In mid-September, the U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, and the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, are expected to report to Congress that the military effort has been succeeding, despite lagging political progress. Then the White House is expected to seek extra time and money to extend the surge through next spring.

Any reduction in violence in Iraq, and any setbacks for al-Qaeda, are to be celebrated and encouraged. But, like a discordant strain intruding on a piece of music, two new reports provide an important reality check on any perceptions that victory might finally be just around the corner.

Last week, the nation's 16 intelligence agencies, in an assessment known as the National Intelligence Estimate, said "the level of overall violence ... remains high" and "Iraq's sectarian groups remain unreconciled." The assessment said Iraq's government would become "more precarious" over the next six to 12 months and its security forces, while showing improvement, still cannot function without help.

Even more discordant, a new draft report from the General Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, questioned official reports of military success in Iraq and was even more damning about political failures. Among the GAO's findings: The Iraqis have met only three of the 18 congressionally mandated benchmarks (the White House, in July, cited satisfactory progress on eight, with mixed progress on three); it contradicted the Bush administration's conclusion that overall sectarian violence is decreasing; it questioned the administration's satisfaction with three Iraqi army brigades deployed to Baghdad, citing questionable loyalty; and it said the number of Iraqi army units capable of operating independently had gone down.

The GAO draft report was leaked to The Washington Post, and the Pentagon said Thursday that it would provide fresh facts that could prompt GAO to revise the final draft. But the findings are hard to dismiss. The GAO is widely regarded as non-partisan and authoritative. It makes exhaustive studies to help members of Congress formulate informed positions on matters ranging from pollution standards to military contracts. It has done more than 100 reports on aspects of the Iraq effort.

Taken together, the reports are a timely reminder that while better security is necessary to bring about a stable Iraq, it is neither imminent nor sufficient.

The point of the surge is to bring breathing room for Iraq's leaders to work toward national reconciliation. But the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been more interested in consolidating Shiite power and sectarian score-setting. Giving it a pass on the benchmarks is like enabling an alcoholic. In the absence of a government dedicated to reconciliation, the best U.S. forces can do is keep a lid on the violence.

Even Gen. Petraeus has said that to tamp down Iraq's civil war might take 10 years. The United States has neither the stamina nor the resources to keep going for that long. Simply lurching forward in six-month increments detracts from the larger goal, which must be to disengage from the Iraq fiasco in a way that does the least damage to long-term U.S. interests in the region.

The Bush administration went into Iraq on the assumption that once Saddam Hussein was toppled, everything would work out for the best. That assessment proved tragically misguided. More than four years later, despite some better news of late, optimism is still not a strategy.